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Applying the Unimodel to Political Persuasion
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Kruglanski and Thompson’s unimodel of persua-
sion provides a theoretical and empirical challenge for
both dual-route theorists and for the numerous scholars
applying the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic Systematic
Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980) to everyday phenomena
like advertising and political campaigning: Why use
two routes of persuasion when, as Kruglanski and
Thompson claim, one is sufficient? In this article, I
first examine why dual-route models have had such
great appeal to those studying the dynamics of political
persuasion. I then contrast different predictions de-
rived from dual-route models and the unimodel. Spe-
cifically, I examine how the two models explain
persuasion in a situation where cue information is
more readily available than message arguments, a situ-
ation that is quite common in the political context.
Political Persuasion
One of the core tasks of politicians is to persuade.
Whether they aim their efforts to persuade at col-
leagues or at citizens, politicians continuously try to
convince others that their party has the best solutions
for the country’s problems and the best people to im-
plement those solutions. The question of how people
come to accept or reject these persuasive messages has
traditionally attracted a lot of attention from both so-
cial psychologists and political scientists. Dual-route
models like the ELM and HSM have been helpful in
understanding political persuasion. Kruglanski and
Thompson’s attempt to replace the two routes by a sin-
gle one is therefore a daring one.
One reason dual-route models have been helpful in
explaining political persuasion is the distinction that is
usually made between politically aware and politically
unaware citizens. In a political utopia, people are
highly politically aware: They hold political attitudes
that are relatively stable over time, that change as a re-
sult of new and relevant message arguments, that show
a certain consistency, and that are predictive of differ-
ent kinds of political behavior (e.g., voting or taking
part in political protest). Before going to the election
booth, these ideal citizens all read the party programs,
they watch the political debates on television, read all
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the op-ed pages, and discuss their findings extensively
with friends, family, and colleagues. In real life, how-
ever, most citizens are not that politically aware: Their
political attitudes are not that consistent and they
change over time in a seemingly random way (Con-
verse, 1964). Voting preferences seem to depend on
candidates’ looks rather than on their political pro-
grams. Citizens lack even the most basic factual politi-
cal knowledge (see Page & Shapiro, 1992, pp. 10–11,
for examples of the lack of political knowledge among
U.S. citizens).
One of the key questions in political persuasion re-
search is how this large group of politically unaware
citizens differs from the politically aware in the way
they come to their political preferences. Both the ELM
and HSM have shown large heuristic value in answer-
ing this question. The cognitive and motivational de-
terminants of the two ELM (or HSM) routes (e.g., low
vs. high need for cognition, low vs. high involvement)
mirror many of the distinctions made in political psy-
chology to separate the politically unaware from the
politically aware: uneducated versus educated (e.g.,
Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Moore, 1995), novice versus
expert (e.g., Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, 1983), and unin-
volved versus involved (e.g., Judd, Krosnick, &
Milburn, 1981).
Politically unaware citizens are usually compared
with the students in the low-involvement condition in
Petty and Cacioppo’s classical comprehensive exam
experiment. As Zaller (1992) put it, “most politics, at
least in the contemporary United States, is notoriously
low key and uninvolving. The stakes are high, but peo-
ple find it hard to stay interested” (p. 47). Under such
conditions, one cannot expect citizens to make the ef-
fort of processing all the message arguments during a
political campaign. Why bother to examine the pros
and cons of NATO expansion or higher minimum
wages if you can judge a candidate by their looks, elo-
quence, or the party they represent?
Politically aware citizens are typically compared to
the students in the high-involvement conditions in the
Petty and Cacioppo experiments. McGraw and Hub-
bard (1996) referred to Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and
stated that the politically aware, whom they called so-
phisticates, “are both motivated and able to carefully
scrutinize a politician’s explanation” (p. 150). Part of
the appeal of dual-route models thus seems to lie in the
fact that the large body of research concerning the
ELM and HSM can be used to hypothesize about dif-
ferences between the politically aware and unaware.
Dual-route models make clear predictions about the
way that people, given their different levels of involve-
ment and knowledge, deal with political persuasive in-
formation.
Apart from this heuristic value of dual-route mod-
els, there is another reason for students of political per-
suasion to resist substituting the two routes for one
single route. To many political theorists there is a qual-
itative difference between political preferences based
on processing peripheral cues (e.g., the looks of the
candidate) versus preferences based on political mes-
sage arguments. Specifically, they contend that
cue-based preferences are more prone to misleading
persuasive attempts than argument-based preferences.
This may not be a principled difference in the persua-
sion process as such, as Kruglanski and Thompson ar-
gue. It does, however, constitute a principled
difference in the way people form political prefer-
ences. In this perspective, the (normative) aim has al-
ways been to make the group of politically aware
citizens as large as possible: Democracy would func-
tion in a better way if its citizens paid more attention to
message arguments than to political cue information.
The assumption is that argument-based preferences
would make citizens less vulnerable to easy solutions
offered by populist politicians.
Given the aforementioned reasons for applying
dual-route models to political persuasion, is there a
reason for applying the unimodel to political persua-
sion? If both models were to make the same predic-
tions about how the politically aware and unaware get
persuaded by political messages, I would argue that
there is no compelling reason to prefer one model over
the other. However, Kruglanski and Thompson’s theo-
rizing leads them to predict that, under certain condi-
tions, dual-route models make predictions that are
quite different from those made by the unimodel.
These conditions, I argue in the remainder of this com-
mentary, are very common in the context of political
persuasion and therefore highly relevant for studying
the effects of political communication.
How to Persuade the Politically
Aware?
The core of Kruglanski and Thompson’s argument
is that “once differences on persuasively relevant in-
formational parameters are controlled for, cue-based
and message argument-based persuasion should be im-
pacted similarly by various persuasively relevant pro-
cessing variables.” Kruglanski and Thompson point to
the length, complexity, and ordinal position of the cues
and message arguments as possible causes of the ef-
fects that are established within the ELM and HSM
framework.
In their first study, Kruglanski and Thompson
showed that when cue information is lengthy and com-
plex, low-involvement participants are not influenced
by cue information, whereas high-involvement partici-
pants are. These conditions, namely cue information
that is more lengthy and complex than message argu-
ments, are quite common in the political information
that people receive from mass media. Kruglanski and
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Thompson’s results thereby question the idea that the
politically aware, typically compared to
high-involvement participants, are persuaded by argu-
ments rather than cues. Thus, in the context of lengthy
and complex cue information, the unimodel predicts
that cue information influences the involved more than
the uninvolved, whereas the dual-route models would
predict the opposite (McGraw & Hubbard, 1996; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986).
In mass media messages about politics, relatively
more attention is devoted to information about the po-
litical sources and their relations with each other than
to information about the issues. Kleinnijenhuis,
Oegema, De Ridder, and Bos (1995) conducted a de-
tailed content analysis of the news during the cam-
paigning for Dutch parliamentary elections in 1994.
Their results showed that about one third of the news
contained issue information (i.e., message arguments),
information about the different parties’ stands on the
issues that are at stake. The remaining two thirds of in-
formation concerned the success a political party had
during the campaign or its relationships with other par-
ties (i.e., cue information).
Another example of the dominance of cue informa-
tion in political news can be found in a study conducted
by Klandermans and Goslinga (1996). These authors
studied the news media content after a highly contro-
versial measure proposed by the Dutch cabinet. In
1991, the Dutch government proposed a drastic cut in
the level of disability benefits, resulting in a period of
large-scale protest. The authors’ analysis of the mass
media reporting about the conflict led them to con-
clude that “It is clear who the actors are … it is much
less clear what exactly the controversy is about” (p.
322). Put differently, in a naturalistic setting message
arguments again appeared to be less salient than cue in-
formation.
Thus, in political news, cue information prevails.
This is an intriguing finding because this is exactly the
condition in which the dual-route models make predic-
tions that are different from the predictions made by
the unimodel. Within the dual-route models it is com-
monly assumed that the politically aware judge a poli-
tician according to his or her issue positions, whereas
the politically unaware use all sorts of judgmental
heuristics (e.g., Snidermann, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991).
The question is whether this hypothesis holds with the
unimodel in mind. Are the politically aware indeed
mainly persuaded by the strength of arguments? The
dual-route models would predict that this is the case
given the higher motivation and ability of the politi-
cally aware. The unimodel, however, predicts that this
effect depends on variations in the information of cues
and message arguments: If cue information is domi-
nant, then the politically aware’s acceptance or rejec-
tion of the political message would be the result of the
extensive processing of cue information. All this de-
pends on the structure of the information that is pro-
vided. Whereas dual-route models attribute effects of
persuasion to different processing modes (central or
peripheral), the unimodel attributes the effects of per-
suasion to information characteristics (e.g., length or
complexity).
Elite Influence on Public Opinion:
An Example From the Gulf War
One of the more consistent findings in political per-
suasion research is that when the political elite (e.g.,
politicians, scientists, journalists) consistently, and
over a long period of time, stresses one point of view
over another, the politically aware tend to follow the
elites’ point of view (the mainstream effect; Zaller,
1987, 1992). When, for example, both Democrat and
Republican U.S. politicians favored sending troops to
the Persian Gulf in the period just after the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait, the politically aware, both Democrats
and Republicans, were the first to accept this point of
view (Zaller, 1994). The question arises whether the
politically aware came to support the elite point of
view because of the presented message arguments or
because of the partisan cues that were provided.
Whereas dual-route models would predict arguments,
whether or not processed in a biased way, to be the vi-
tal factor here, the Unimodel would predict that politi-
cal involvement leads people to process the cues more
extensively. Cues in such a situation are powerful: Al-
most everybody that matters in Washington agreed
that troops should be sent.
Departing from dual-route models, Zaller (1992)
explained the mainstream effect by stating that all citi-
zens should be regarded as the low-involvement par-
ticipants in the ELM or HSM experiments. He thus
questioned the generalizability of the ELM and HSM
findings concerning the highly involved to the highly
politically aware. In his view, the only difference be-
tween the politically aware and the politically unaware
is the amount of exposure to political information and
the ease with which the politically aware can put politi-
cal (mostly partisan) cues to use. The unimodel would
state that whether the politically aware are persuaded
more by arguments than by cues depends on the struc-
ture of the information that is provided. Both argu-
ments and cues can be processed extensively and both
can lead the politically aware to change their opinion.
The Gulf War example clearly shows the value of
the unimodel in explaining political persuasion. The
unimodel can explain the mainstream effect without
making the additional assumption, like Zaller does,
that everybody is relatively uninvolved. Similarly, it
can explain the mainstream effect without assuming
that the politically aware are convinced by message
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arguments mainly, like the dual-route models would
argue.
Concluding Remarks
Political persuasion research is often conducted in
naturalistic settings (e.g., mass surveys). These set-
tings make it difficult to control for the type of infor-
mation that people have encountered in the way that is
typical for Kruglanski and Thompson’s studies. Re-
search in naturalistic settings often has to rely on as-
sumptions about the information that people encounter
and about the way they process this information. These
assumptions are often based on dual-route models like
the ELM and HSM. The implicit assumption in the
ELM is that cue information is short and simple,
whereas arguments are lengthy and complex. Al-
though one would wish this to be the case in political
news, the practice of newsgathering makes such a
structure of news very unlikely. Extensive argumenta-
tion about political issues is usually confined to those
pages that very few people read.
Kruglanski and Thompson’s unimodel should lead
scholars of political persuasion to take another look
at the assumptions they hold concerning the structure
of political information and the way the politically
aware and the politically unaware use this informa-
tion to come to a judgment. This could lead to hy-
potheses that are the opposite of the hypotheses de-
rived from dual-route models. For example, under
certain conditions, message arguments could lead the
politically aware to change their opinions, whereas
the politically aware are influenced by extensive cue
information.
It remains to be seen whether the unimodel can ac-
count for several well-established differences between
the attitudes of the politically aware and unaware. The
studies conducted by Kruglanski and Thompson did
not consider the consequences of processing cues ver-
sus message arguments under conditions of high in-
volvement. For example, does cue processing under
high involvement lead to the stable attitudes that are
characteristic of highly politically aware citizens? Are
these attitudes as consequential for behavior as atti-
tudes resulting from extensive arguments processing?
These are some questions still to be answered by the
unimodel.
Note
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